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IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE 

Magistrate Appeal No. 33/2007/01 )

Case No. OA. 46/2006   ) 

Between

CHEE SOON JUAN

(NRIC NO. S1570330Z) 

…Appellant 

v. 

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

(NO. ID NUMBER EXISTS) 

…Respondent 
 
 
 
 
 
 

ALFRED DODWELL

MESSRS ALFRED DODWELL

3 PICKERING STREET

#01-63 NANKIN ROW

CHINA SQUARE CENTRAL

SINGAPORE 046680

Filed this 24th Day of August 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 

INTRODUCTION 

  1. The Appellant/Petitioner was charged with the following charge:-
 
  1. On 26 February 2007, the Appellant was convicted in the Subordinate Court No. 5 of the said charge. The Learned District Judge levied a fine of $4,000.00 (in default 3 weeks imprisonment). The Appellant, being dissatisfied with the conviction and/or sentence in respect of OA. 46/2006 filed his Notice of Appeal, and subsequent thereto, filed his Petition of Appeal. We now file herein the Skeletal Arguments in this matter.
 

APPEAL IN RELATION TO CONVICTION 

  1. The Appellant’s first ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge had erred in law and/or in fact when he failed to refer the case and/or specific issue as set out hereinbelow to the High Court by way of Constitutional Reference under Section 56A Subordinate Courts Act (Cap. 321). This is because the Appellant had indicated that as Constitutional issue will be raised as a Defence, the matter should be referred to the Supreme Court. The issue raised by the Appellant was of the different treatment accorded to bankrupts, who are persons within the same class, in that with respect to applications to travel out of Singapore, there is discrimination and/or inequality effected through the categorisation of insolvent persons into one of two zones, the ‘green’ or the ‘red’ and the criterion(s) applied thereto is in violation of Article 12, Constitution of the Republic of Singapore.
 
  1. As such, the Appellant being a bankrupt was clearly a person who suffered the consequence of this clear breach and/or violation of the Constitutional protection that is accorded to him, a citizen of Singapore, that though he is a bankrupt, he will not be placed under further classification that is clearly discriminatory and based on his impecunious state. 
 
  1. If we draw upon an example of a person being of lowly income or for that matter is a volunteer or involved in charity works, and is a bankrupt. Thus, he or she is unable to earn much income to sustain his family and also to pay to creditors, but is otherwise involved in work that benefits society at large,  - should he or she be penalised and subjected to such unequal treatment by IPTO in this unfair and unjust categorization? This categorization is not just unjust in its application, it is unjust as a policy. It clearly is a violation of the equality clause of the Singapore Constitution and it is our humble submission that this Court is invited to state that this policy as applied in any manner by IPTO is clearly a violation of the equality clause, especially within a particular class, in this case, within the class of bankrupts. Are some bankrupts better than others? Is it not the very nature of their impecuniosities that caused them to become bankrupts? So, why is it some can travel, and some cannot travel based on their financial distributions? This issue of categorization and linking this to travel permits or refusal to permit should not become a carrot that is dangled to a bankrupt. It violates the basic purpose of such equality clause that is to link human dignity to the issue of equality. The whole premise of the modernity of law to steer clear of former arcane laws is to ensure that all men are treated equal and accorded equal treatment by the law, especially within a particular class.  The Constitution cannot and must not take a back-seat to the internal policies of IPTO even if it is to IPTO’s operational convenience.
 
  1. The Courts have a role to be the conscience of society, to speak with one accord with the Constitution of Singapore that specifically deals with the issue of equal treatment. Thus, we humbly submit that the Constitution must be given a wide reading to protect the rights of citizens and not to be given such a restrictive reading that rights seem to be effectively nugatory and administrative convenience has taken precedence over rights. Thus, it is our submission that any legislation or directions, leaflets that seek to dictate the manner in which people are treated, especially linking it to the issue of travel permits is a clear violation of the said equality clause.
 
  1. The second ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge erred in law and/or in fact in his assessment of the issue of contamination of the evidence (ie. where the Prosecutor and witness (PW4) admitted to have communicated) whilst PW4 was still giving evidence and tendered a document through the Prosecutor. It is not suggested that there was impropriety, without evidence, such a submission cannot and must not be made to ever taint the integrity of a prosecutor nor the witness (a respected civil servant of IPTO), but solely we invited this Court that in applying the maxim, “Justice must be seen to be done”, the evidence of PW4 should have been rejected in its totality at the trial and thus, the Learned District Judge should have not considered her evidence at all at the trial.
 
  1. In the circumstance, the Appellant states that this should have been a mistrial, alternatively based on this issue the conviction should be quashed. Further alternative is that if this Honourable Court is minded to at the very least strike out the evidence of PW4, we humbly submit that the Learned Trial Judge would not have sufficient grounds upon which to sustain and convict, and therefore an acquittal should have been recorded.
 
  1. The basis for this submission is that at the trial of this matter, that is on Monday, 29th January 2007, during re-examination, the Deputy Public Prosecutor sought to admit evidence, an email, during re-examination of PW4. First, it is our humble submission that this goes against the very purpose of re-examination, which is restricted to clarification on the issues raised during cross-examination. In so doing, that is trying to adduce fresh evidence at re-examination, the Prosecution was seeking to admit through the back-door at the re-examination stage. Second, that in any case, the recipient of the email was PW3 and not PW4, so it should have been admitted through PW3, if at all. Third, that the manner in which the question was phrased and which proceeded to elicit the appropriate response of the witness, PW4 leading to the tendering of the email evidence indicates that the prosecutor and the witness have spoken during the period the witness is still on the stand giving evidence. It is undisputed that the witness did speak with the Prosecutor and handed her the email. This was admitted by both the Prosecutor and the witness. The email was discovered by the witness and handed over to the Prosecutor, and it was obviously planned between the both of them that they will seek to tender it during re-examination, with the view that it can then be subjected to cross examination. However, this clearly goes against the judges order that whilst the witness is on the stand she is not to discuss her evidence or the case with anyone else. It is irrelevant that the witness is a layperson, for there are laypersons giving evidence in the Courts daily, and that does not provide them with an excuse to ignore the judges clear order that she is not to discuss the evidence. The said witness is not an uneducated person, but a graduate and the Manager of Individual Bankruptcy, IPTO. What is to prevent a witness who had thus ignored the directive of the judge from not only reviewing her file for the evidence, but also discussed the probative value of the evidence and the manner in which it will be tendered in Court. The accused person cannot be clear at which point the discussion started between the witness and the Prosecutor and at which point it ended. It cannot be left to speculation. It must be disregarded in its entirety to ensure that the accused is provided with a fair trial. Another troubling point raised by the Prosecutor is that the witness, being a layperson may not have understood the order of the judge not to discuss the evidence. This opens up another train of enquiry, as this may mean that she may have also discussed the evidence with the next witness coming on the stand, PW5. As it is conceded that the witness may not have understood the order of the judge. Furthermore, their evidence is tendered to seek to corroborate a particularly damaging accusation which the accused person flatly denies. The Legal Profession (Professional Conduct Rules) 1998, states quite clearly at  Part IV, Rule 62, “An Advocate and solicitor shall not interview or discuss with a witness, whom the advocate and solicitor has called, his evidence or the evidence of the other witness while such a witness is under cross-examination. As a general rule, it is undesirable for witnesses to discuss their evidence or be seen together in circumstance which invite suspicion as to whether they may have collaborated to give evidence. (see Lee Kwang Peng v. PP [1997] 3 SLR 278). On appeal, this Honourable Court is humbly invited to clarify this whole issue on the facts that is before this Honourable Court.
 
  1. The third ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge erred in law and/or in fact in his interpretation of Section 131 Bankruptcy Act (Cap. 20) that he ruled that Section 511 Penal Code (Cap. 224) that is that there can be a “attempt”, whereas it is the Appellant’s case that Section 131 Bankruptcy Act clearly only penalises those who “who leave Singapore” and therefore is not a crime as long as the bankrupt still remains in Singapore. For this particular crime to be made out, the Appellant must have physically left Singapore and in this case, the Petitioner did not leave Singapore. It would be extremely wide to apply Section 511 Penal Code to this particular legislation.
 
  1. The Appellant travelled under a mistake of fact, thinking that by reason of a mistake of fact as to whether his application was rejected or not, and not clear as to whether permission was granted or not, whether such permission would have been communicated directly to ICA and that he could only know upon presentation of his passport, he made his way to the ICA counter at the airport.
 
  1. The Appellant also travelled under a mistake of law, as he was unclear that the mere presentation of the passport would constitute a crime. This is unclear from any legislation, and the mere presentation of the passport, without the requisite intent cannot amount to a crime. The legislation does not state that the mere presentation of the passport is a crime or is even tantamount to an attempt.
 
  1. The fourth point ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge erred in law and/or in fact in that he failed to consider the issue of whether Section 131 Bankruptcy Act in itself, that is the part of the legislation which reads “he shall not leave, remain or reside outside Singapore without the previous permission of the Official Assignee” is in violation of Article 12, Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. Imposing travel restrictions upon any class of citizen based on their impecunious state or failure to qualify to artificial test that is highly arbitrary and/or ambiguous is discriminatory and/or accords unequal treatment upon bankrupts, of whom, the Petitioner is one.
 
  1. It is common knowledge that the Appellant has been an enigmatic character in the Singapore political landscape. He is the Secretary General of Singapore Democratic Party, an opposition political party in Singapore. He has gotten into much trouble with the law over his political beliefs and convictions. These are matters for the political arena, and individuals and parties can canvass their ideology in the marketplace of ideas. That is not for consideration before this Court. It does not matter if the Petitioner has previous convictions pertaining to the controversial legislation - Public Entertainment & Meetings Act (Chapter 257). He has also been cited for Contempt of Court. But in this case, it is not about politics. This case is about the Appellant, not the politician, but a citizen of Singapore. He deserves to be treated like any other citizen and be dealt in accordance with the due process of the law and with the rule of law. He is to be given equal treatment before the Law Courts and he is to be treated just as any other citizen of Singapore.
 
  1. The fifth ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge, erred in law and/or in fact at paragraphs 69 - 72 of his Grounds of Decision in that he ruled that the Appellant “did intend to leave the jurisdiction”. This was against the weight of the evidence at the trial. There is little doubt that the Appellant was desirous of leaving jurisdiction for a conference and had every intent to leave jurisdiction, but he was acting under a mistake of fact that he thought he had permission to leave or was under the impression that permission may have been communicated to the Immigration officials at the airport, and as such the he did not have the mental element to make out the ingredient that he intentionally committed the offence. The Appellant does not possess the requisite mens rea in this matter to be said to have committed this offence. If the Appellant lacked the mens rea, certainly there are doubts as to his intention for being at the airport, and doubts as to whether he was clearly acting with wilful intent, then it must be resolved in his favour. The Appellant did not take preparatory steps, knowing that he was presenting himself to hookwind the authorities to leave Singapore. That is the kind of publicity that he could truly do without. He is seeking to obtain credible status and as politics in Singapore has proven, the populace are very interested in credible men and women standing for political office. As such, it would further seek to isolate him from popular consensus to action in clear and blatant violation of the law. It is our humble submission that it is unlikely that in this instance, he would act with such open defiance of the law. It is not a matter that impinges into his political existence. It is not about a wilful protest march, strike, etc, to assert rights without permits or otherwise. This is not such a case. This is a case of a simple travel for an all paid for conference, as a respectable member of the Singapore opposition. So, the Appellant going to the airport is not an attempt to commit the offence at all.
 
  1. The sixth ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge, erred in law and/or in fact in that he failed to consider that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and that the Appellant was able to cast doubt and raise several reasonable doubts as to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, namely PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5 as to the actual mode, manner, communication of the permission. In Matt v. PP [1963] MLJ 263, Suffian J set out clearly the correct test for a judge to apply in consideration of guilt in criminal cases, he stated:-
  1. The seventh ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge, erred in law and/or in fact in that whilst he concluded that “it was necessary for the Appellant to intend to leave the jurisdiction” (emphasis added) (see paragraph 68 of the Grounds of Decision), it contradicts his conclusion at paragraphs 73, 95-97 of the Grounds of Decision which makes Section 131, Bankruptcy Act a strict liability offence. If the Judge was of the view that intend is necessary, the question is not that he intended to leave the jurisdiction, for there is little doubt that he intended to do so, but the real issue is whether he intended to travel out of Singapore with criminal intent to be in violation of the law. If he was merely negligent on the issue of obtaining permission, that does not amount to an act of “crime”. Any ambiguity as to this issue should be resolved in favour of the Appellant herein, and not in favour of the prosecution. It is clear that the totality of the evidence does not make it clear if the Appellant was clearly informed of the lack of permission and that his presence at the airport and travel was a criminal act in clear violation.
 
  1. The eighth ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge, erred in law and/or in fact in that he did not accord due consideration to the fact that the Appellant was applying for the travel permission for the first time and so he was unclear and/or unsure as to the actual manner in which permission would have been provided, and taking the totality of the various communications and/or miscommunications and/or non-communications from the IPTO officials (who were prosecution witnesses), it is the Appellant’s contention that a reasonable doubt was cast in this case as to whether the Appellant knew he could not travel out of Singapore. It must be highlighted that the Petitioner has never prior to this application ever put in any request to travel. This was his first time. He has never gone through this process to be placed with express knowledge of how this is to be done. So, the Official Assignee’s office strained hard to present evidence through 5 witnesses from IPTO, all with the sole purpose of placing knowledge squarely on the shoulders of the Petitioner.
 
  1. The ninth ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge, erred in law and/or in fact in that he ruled erroneously that the Appellant knew permission had not been given. It is our humble submission that this was against the weight of the evidence. It is clear that the ICA officer, PW 8, stated that the Petitioner could not have found out if he could be allowed to travel out of Singapore or not prior to actually physically being present to present his passport. Is there a clear, unambiguous notation in any of the documents that the Appellant received that states that the mere presentation of the passport at Changi International Airport is tantamount to a crime? There is no such document. The fact remains that the Appellant is a new bankrupt. He is unaware of the manner in which permissions are granted. He is unaware that IPTO may allow and provide permission that could be communicated directly to ICA, and that he could find out at the airport by presenting the passport. A choice colloquial term, “try your luck” aptly captures the mindset of the Appellant. He was of the view that if he is blacklisted from travel, he will not be permitted to leave, and he would return home. Conversely, in this case, he had proceeded to purchase his tickets. After all, the conference was to commence on 2nd April 2006, which was a Sunday. As of Friday, 31st March 2006, the answer appears to be that it is certainly under consideration. Who would expect that such consideration can continue even till the date of the conference, and even after the conference till the reply in relation to such an application actually comes 25 days after the application was placed before IPTO, and more importantly 12 days after the start of the conference or to put it plainly the rejection letter comes 6 days after the conclusion of the conference. This is clearly a ground upon which the Appellant should have been given an acquittal in this matter.
 
  1. The tenth ground of appeal is that Learned District Judge erred in law and/or in fact on the issue of a mistake of fact (see paragraphs 74 – 92 of the Grounds of Decision). This was against the weight of evidence at the trial as there were conflicting emails and requirements placed on the Appellant by IPTO officials that could have led the Appellant to be confused and unaware if he had permission to travel out of Singapore, and thus the defence of mistake of fact had been clearly established at the trial or implicitly from the evidence proffered at the trial. The truth of the matter is that this is not a case of wilful intentional violation of a clear rejection of the Appellant’s travel application. There was no refusal right till the day of the travel and even many days thereafter. The bureaucratic reply both simple yet ambiguous from the Official Assignee’s office was that his application was still under consideration. What is the meaning of such a reply especially where the travel date, the conference date and the event comes and goes?...yet there is no actual reply from IPTO. In fact, the rejection of the application eventually came via snail mail on 13th April 2006. The application itself was made on 20th March 2006. The conference comes and goes, and there is still no rejection of the application to travel. The height of bureaucracy and unchecked powers is where the applicant is left with no real answers, left in a quandary, helpless, confused, and assuming that he may have complied with all requirements, seeks to find out if permission was granted by presenting himself at the airport, only to have his passport taken away (which is not a crime in itself) but later to be charged with attempt to leave Singapore. This is most unfair, most unjust and most unsound of treatment that can be levied upon a person. It is unfair and unjust that with such utter confusion, as will be outlined in this submission, and which was obvious from the facts of this case, the Appellant was not given the benefit of the doubt. If it was so, he should have been acquitted.
 
  1. The eleventh ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge, erred in law and/or in fact in that he found that the Appellant’s mere consideration if he would be stopped at the airport was a “crime”. Conversely, this was proof that the Appellant did not know and/or was unsure if he had permission or not, and thus lacked the knowledge and/or intention to have committed the crime. Thus, we humbly submit that the elements of crime has not been made out and the Appellant should have been acquitted.
 
  1. The twelfth ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge, erred in law and/or in fact in that the judge misapplied the law to the facts of this case at paragraphs 95 – 97 of the Grounds of Decision in that whilst he ruled that there must be an intention to leave Singapore with negligence, recklessness or knowledge that prior permission had not been given by the Official Assignee, the Learned District Judge failed to consider that the weight of evidence was against a finding that the Appellant was  negligent, reckless or had knowledge that permission had not been given. The Judge cannot  rule that the Appellant was on the one hand “negligent” without explanation that it was criminally negligent, and/or criminally reckless, thus it is our humble submission that the Judge’s position is untenable in law and in fact and as such, the Appellant cannot be said to have committed a crime in this instance.
 
  1. The thirteenth ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge, erred in law and/or in fact in that he failed to accord due weight to the evidence that proved that there was miscommunication and/or lack of communication between IPTO officials and the Appellant to be essential elements for his consideration toward the determination of the Appellant’s subjective state of mind which if considered would have led to the conclusion that the Appellant lacked knowledge of the specific requirements upon him. The Prosecution’s Witness certainly would try to paint a picture of perfection in their backyard at IPTO. Whilst it must be commended that on such a lean staff strength, the IPTO officers have to manage up to 25,000 bankrupts affairs. It must be stressful, and certainly such a job is not to be envied. But under such stressful conditions, many mistakes can take place, and there can be lapses in matters. IPTO had six officers interchangeably, overlapping and crossing each other’s roles in dealing with the Appellant. The messages were unclear, as PW3 said, PW2 did not communicate nor check with her prior to sending off an email concerning travel to the Appellant.  PW4 was unaware that the Appellant had mentioned travel to PW1 and PW2 at the meeting on 9th March 2006, in fact she stated in evidence that she only knew of it on 23rd March 2006. In the state of utter chaos that appears to prevalent in the  IPTO office, the requirements did not make sense and it can be subjected to misinterpretation. Let us remember that this is the Appellant’s first attempt to travel. All matters must be seen through the eyes of the Appellant, without the benefit of the clarification and explanation that the Prosecution witnesses offered in Court. In hindsight, the IPTO can explain away all their faults, and all that they meant to communicate in their emails. But what was the state of mind of the Appellant, the recipient of these emails from IPTO officers. He had communicated or dealt with one Rohana (who was not called as a witness), PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5. All of them were communicating with him on the issue of travel, but two of them, PW4 & PW5 go one step further, they say that in a meeting that took place at IPTO offices on 28th March 2006, the Appellant wilfully stated that he will travel whether he had IPTO permission or not. This is merely oral evidence. Though PW4 wrote to outline what was spoken at their meeting, she did not deem it fit to state for the record that the Petitioner had stated that “he will travel”. The benefit of the doubt must be given to the Petitioner that he did not state so. For, his actions do not seem to indicate that he was disinterested in obtaining IPTO’s permission. This is clearly not stated at all in the evidence of this in the subsequent email (P18). The benefit of the doubt in relation to whether he actually communicated this to these officers must be given to the Appellant, who denies it. His actions certainly does not seem to indicate so. He was still providing IES, and was still writing to them, clarifying with IPTO. This ambiguity cannot be used to convict the Appellant.
 
  1. The fourteen ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge, erred in law and/or in fact that the he failed to consider or at least be mindful that there may be actual or apparent bias of the witnesses of IPTO and/or that their actions taken in its totality can be said to contain elements that can lead to entrapment of the Appellant at the airport by failing to communicate to him clearly that he did not have permission to travel out of Singapore. It is apparent that this must qualify to be the most high-handed handling of bankrupt and dealings in their affairs. The bankrupt may have been imprudent with his finances that may have landed him in bankruptcy, at least that is the usual case, but the bankrupt does not deserve to be treated with such inhumanity. It appears that IPTO is waiting for one misstep by the bankrupt and to pounce mercilessly upon him.
 
  1. The fifteenth ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge, erred in law and/or in fact in that he failed to consider the cardinal effect to the whole case to be attributable to the failure on the part of the Official Assignee’s office to provide a clear, unambiguous rejection of the Appellant’s travel application, which was not provided at any date prior to the envisaged date of travel and only came approximately 14 days after the intended date of travel. This case can be summed up as one of miscommunication. Miscommunication compounded by having at least six officers of Insolvency & Public Trustee’s Office (“IPTO”) dealing with the Appellant and providing mixed, varied, sometimes even confusing messages. How was the Appellant to interpret these variety of messages, contentions, requirements? In such a state of quagmire, how was he to react? Would it be fair on him to be charged with an offence where the swamp of IPTO is murky, unclear and confusing.
 
  1. The sixteenth ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge erred in law and/or in fact in that he failed to consider that in relation to his decision at paragraph 103 of the Grounds of Decision, the Appellant was equally entitled to come to the conclusion that a permission had been granted and that it was communicated to the Immigration. The Appellant, being a first time travel applicant, was unawares of the whole bankruptcy regime and the nature of how permission would be granted. Therefore, at best, the Appellant was acting on an innocent mistake of fact.
 
  1. The seventeenth ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge, erred in law and/or in fact in that he failed to give due practical consideration to civil servants failure to communicate clearly and unambiguously the lack of permission to travel even up to the date of travel and even approximately 14 days after the intended date of travel, so the Appellant should not have to face criminal sanctions and penalty for the fault that lies solely in the IPTO for failing to communicate the permission or lack thereof clearly prior to the intended date of travel. The Appellant’s state of mind from all of this is clear, IPTO used this situation of his application to travel to arm twist him into giving a proposal for monthly instalments to his creditors, where the facts  is that he has a wife and 3 very young children to support. He earns approximately $1,200.00. His expense exceeds his income, and these are not extravagant expenses. Yet, they want to have this issue resolved by forcing the bankrupt to give a proposal, and when none was forthcoming, they say they will tell him the amount he is to pay. He was left utterly confused from all of this. After much  correspondence, it will take an expert to decipher the sum total content of the messages. How are these to be interpreted? Should the messages and email communications be considered from the objective reading of the judge, or the interpretive slant that IPTO wants to give to it? It must be viewed from the interpretation, reading, even the misreading of the Appellant, and he must be given the benefit of the doubt in this matter. He must be believed at his word that he misunderstood the messages. 
 
  1. The eighteenth ground of appeal is that the Learned District Judge, erred in law and/or in fact in that he did not give due consideration to the Appellant’s cooperation and openness of his travel plan which indicates he never intended to travel out of Singapore without permission, but at all times communicated his intention to ensure that he worked with the Official Assignee to obtain permission, and as such, travelled only on a mistake of fact. The Appellant is not guilty of this charge. It was not an open defiant act. This is not evident in any of the emails, or correspondence. If he had allegedly stated that he wants to travel out of Singapore regardless of being provided with permission or not, this would have shown in his action. He would not have even bothered to apply and right till the eleventh hour continue to do all he could toward this matter, such as to provide the letter from the organizer, fill up the Income & Expenditure Statement (“IES”), and inform them repeatedly that as he has insufficient income and thus they can conclude the amount he can pay toward the bankrupt’s estate. He sought to comply with all that was requested of him, and he was under the impression that the only outstanding issue of monthly instalments to the benefit of creditors will be determined by IPTO. It is only upon being told that they will determine the matter, did the Appellant proceed to purchase tickets to travel.
 

APPEAL IN RELATION TO SENTENCE 

  1. By reasons of errors in fact and in law as set out above, the sentence imposed by the Learned District Judge on the charge was wrong in law and/or was manifestly excessive:-
 
    1. First, we humbly submit that the Learned District Judge erred in law and in fact when he determined that a bankrupt who leaves the jurisdiction “may put himself out of the reach of the bankruptcy regime”.  There is no basis for a crime to be committed on a mere assumption of this nature.  This was an erroneous consideration for purposes of sentencing.
 
    1. Second, we humbly submit that the Learned District Judge erred in law and in fact when, (without the benefit of any statistics or evidence tendered at the trial), the Judge drew the assumption that the travel restrictions places greater trust in the bankruptcy regime. This was an erroneous consideration for purposes of sentencing.
 
    1. Third, we humbly submit that the Learned District Judge erred in law and in fact that a bankrupt who leaves jurisdiction may place himself out of the reach of the bankruptcy regime. There is no statistics provided to lend support to this notion and is wrong in law and in fact. This is an erroneous consideration for purposes of sentencing.
 
    1. Fourth, we humbly submit that the Learned District Judge erred in law and in fact on the points he had raised in paragraphs 107 -108 of the Grounds of Decision as this is not a basis that lends support to the seriousness of the offence.
 
    1. Fifth, we humbly submit that the Learned District Judge erred in law and in fact in that he failed to consider the totality of the evidence that indicates that the Petitioner may have been acting on a mistake of fact and also that IPTO had failed to render clear and unambiguous communications, so the judge should have provided for only a nominal fine or other reasonable nominal amount as this Honourable Court deems fit in the circumstances and the peculiar facts of this case.  
  1. Your Petitioner prays that for the reasons set out in the ground of appeal herein the said conviction be quashed or such order may be made thereon as justice may require.
 
  1. Alternatively, your Petitioner prays for a determination that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, and as such, your Petitioner prays that the said sentence be reduced or that such Order may be made thereon, as justice may require.
 

Dated this 24th Day of August 2007 
 

                                 Messrs Alfred Dodwell 
 
 
 

The address for service of the above-named Appellant is:

      Messrs Alfred Dodwell

      No. 3 Pickering Street

      #01-63 Nankin Row

      China Square Central

      Singapore 048660

      Tel: 6327 6292

      Fax: 6327 6290 
 

To:  The Public Prosecutor

      c/o The Attorney-General’s Chambers

      1 Coleman Street

      #10-00 The Adelphi

      Singapore 179803


 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

Magistrate Appeal No. 33/2007/01)

                              Case No.  OA. 46/2006 ) 

Between

CHEE SOON JUAN

(NRIC NO. S1570330Z) 

…Appellant

v.

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

(NO. ID NUMBER EXISTS) 

…Respondent

APPELLANT SKELETAL ARGUMENTS

 

Alfred Dodwell 

Messrs Alfred Dodwell

No. 3 Pickering Street

#01-63 Nankin Row

China Square Central

Singapore 048660

Tel No. 6327 6292

Fax No. 6327 6290 

Ref: AD/1093/2006/CSJ 
 
 

Filed this 24th Day of August  2007